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On April 21, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez announced drastic changes to windfall oil
tax rates, hiking the tax from 60 percent to 95 percent when oil prices surpass $100 per
barrel. The new legislation also raises the taxes to 80 percent when oil prices are between
$70-90 per barrel and 90 percent when prices are between $90-100 per barrel. The
government has since sought to reassure investors, saying that companies will only pay the
higher rates after they recoup their original investment. How are the new taxes likely to
affect investment in the country's oil sector in the short- and medium-term? How will the
taxes affect the development of Venezuela's Orinoco belt? Are Chávez's social spending
projects, funded with oil revenues, achieving lasting results?

A: Gustavo Coronel, former member of the board of directors of PDVSA:
"The new Venezuelan oil tax was to affect all companies producing oil in Venezuela but
was rapidly modified to include only Petroleos de Venezuela and its partners in joint ventures,
excluding those foreign companies initiating projects in the Orinoco region, any incremental
production generated during 2010 and the oil exports to China that are in payment of the Chinese
loans. The new tax, therefore, will be applied to about one million barrels per day of oil
production. The big losers are, of course, the state-owned petroleum company and its foreign
partners in the joint ventures. The major impact of this new tax will be political, designed to
show the government as obtaining maximum benefits for the nation. Hugo Chávez is already
campaigning for re-election in December 2012. A second effect will be the loss of autonomy of
Petroleos de Venezuela. The new tax intensifies the direct transfer of oil income to the central
government, leaving the company with little money for investments. This is tragic for a company
that keeps getting into new debt. The third effect will be to increase the reluctance of foreign
companies to invest in the country. All in all, the short-term financial benefit that can be obtained
from this new taxation is clearly offset by its detrimental effects in the long term. Social projects
that should have been generated by oil income are nowhere to be seen in a country where
promises have replaced deeds."

A: Juan Pablo Fuentes, economist at Moody's Analytics:
"A recently announced increase in the windfall oil tax is another example of arbitrary
policymaking by the Venezuelan government. Since the early 2000s, the government has used
revisions of the legal framework for the oil industry to advance two clear goals: obtaining control
over all oil-related operations and increasing the industry's tax burden. Unsurprisingly, the result
has been disastrous for Venezuela's oil industry. Output has declined consistently in recent years
despite record high oil prices. The government seems to be genuinely concerned about falling oil
output and is aggressively pursuing new investments to develop the Orinoco Belt. Despite some
concessions and high global oil prices, international oil companies (including state-owned
companies) have remained cautious about investing in Venezuela. The latest increase in the
windfall tax will only make investors more reluctant. Some of the new Orinoco projects were
already in doubt due to PDVSA's inability to finance its share. The windfall tax increase might
effectively kill some of those projects, even though the government offered them temporary
exemptions from the increase. In any event, the windfall tax hike will further delay development
of the Orinoco Belt. The main victim of the tax increase is PDVSA, which will suffer a
measurable drop in revenues, further eroding its finances. This will make it harder for PDVSA to
invest in new projects as well as to maintain existing oilfields. PDVSA's ability to fund social
programs will also decline. In essence, the government is transferring that responsibility, at least
partially, to the development fund, Fonden. The increase in the windfall tax will provide
President Hugo Chávez with about $12 billion in additional revenues this year. These resources
will fund higher levels of government spending on wages, imports and some infrastructure
projects designed to boost Chávez's reelection chances in 2012."

A: Boris Segura, economist at Nomura Securities International Inc.:
"This changed oil taxation in Venezuela is likely to have a lasting impact on the private
sector's willingness to invest. The new sudden profits tax represents yet another change in 'the
rules of the game' in the oil sector, which is likely to have a chilling effect on private investment
in the sector, especially at a time when the authorities are putting pressure on minority partners
to increase investment and production. This new tax regime practically borders on confiscation
once oil prices surpass $70 per barrel. These tax changes are particularly relevant to the
development of new heavy oil projects in the Carabobo/Junin areas. As there are very costly
investments (basic infrastructure, upgraders, etc.) that run in the billions of dollars, the
unpredictability of the basic investment conditions are likely to make it more difficult for
minority partners to justify allocating resources to new investments in Venezuela. The jury is
still out on the effectiveness of President Chávez's social programs. However, this latest tax
change is explicitly devised to allow the authorities to do away with oversight on the use of
public resources, displaying a worrisome lack of transparency. As such, the Fondo de Desarrollo
Nacional (Fonden) provides plenty of discretion to the authorities in deciding how to spend the
revenues it holds that otherwise would have to go into the official budget. More importantly,
Fonden captures revenues from PDVSA before they make it into the budget, so as to avoid
sharing them with the states and municipalities."

A: Carlos Bellorin, petroleum analyst at IHS in London:
"The new 'special contribution' (SC) as it is known, also set in $70 per barrel as the
ceiling for the calculation of royalty, extraction tax and import registry tax payments for
companies liable to pay the SC and established a 20 percent rate on the difference between the
price of the value of the Venezuelan hydrocarbon basket as established in the Annual Budget
Law (currently $40) and $70 per barrel. The first tier ($40-70) is the regressive part of the SC
which commences to be progressive after price breaks up the $70 per barrel barrier. Although
progressive in nature, the biggest chunk of the SC is payable when prices are between $70-90
because the base is larger than the second tier ($90- 100) and mostly likely to be larger than the
third one (greater than $100), even though the rates are higher when prices are higher. The effect
on investments is still to be assessed when the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum issues a
resolution in order to help in the implementation of the SC, defining the parameters for 'recovery
of investments' and 'incremental production,' which are essential issues to determine if a certain
project is exempted from the payment of the SC or not. What can be said now is that this new
levy will have a negative effect in the cost of the financing the new projects in the Orinoco Belt.
This would be the most immediate effect. Existing projects in Venezuela (including the ones in
the Orinoco belt) are liable to pay the SC although their 'incremental production' is exempted and
new projects are exempted from this tax until they have recouped their total investments. Again,
we will have to wait for the ministry's resolution to measure the full impact of the SC. It is not a
secret that despite the massive amount of money received by the Chávez administration, it hasn't
been able to implement any sustainable, lasting and viable social projects. I really hope that this
trend changes during this new high oil price wave."

The Energy Advisor welcomes responses to the Q&A above. Readers can write editor Gene
Kuleta at kuleta@thedialogue.org with comments.

